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# THE RELATION OF IDEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE TO PUBLIC POLICY

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

THE intelligence function adapts itself to changing conceptions of policy and to innovations in the procedures by which facts are gathered, analyzed, and presented. New policy ideas are today resulting from the vast transformations that are taking place in the structure of society, state, and government. New methods of observing, analyzing, and reporting data have arisen as an outcome of the growth of modern social and psychological sciences. So swift is the stream that we may fail in every effort to chart the banks within which it flows; yet the importance of seeking to understand the complex relationship of policy and intelligence is great enough to justify the risks involved. Greater clarity may reduce the amount of fumbling that is invariably associated with new efforts to adapt old functions to different conditions.

A canvass of the existing literature reveals that very little systematic and unified treatment has been given to the intelligence function. In limited spheres, notably in relation to military policy, there are theoretical discussions and practical manuals.<sup>1</sup> It has long been an axiom that command depends on adequate intelligence of the resources and plans of the enemy. In the realm of diplomacy there are valuable hints on how information may be obtained.<sup>2</sup> Con-

cern for the internal security of the state<sup>3</sup> and aspirations toward revolutionary action<sup>4</sup> have both inspired contributions to the intelligence problem. The literature of democracy has reiterated the need of an intelligent public opinion; however, there has been a minimum of advance toward specifying the criteria by which relevant intelligence for the citizen and the official may be recognized.<sup>5</sup>

It is possible to fathom some of the factors that have contributed to the comparative neglect of the intelligence function as a whole. In preliberal, predemocratic states, ideological policy was simple. The aims of policy in this field were to detect sedition at home and conspiracy abroad and to encourage the reverent acceptance of state-friendly religions. In liberal, democratic states, however, there is nothing simple about the ideological goals, if we take these aspirations literally. Democracy means respect for human dignity. This implies a commonwealth of mutual deference. (To be deferred to is to be taken into consideration; in a democratic government or state this calls for participation in the making of important decisions.) Policy is democratic when it is consistent and compatible with human

<sup>3</sup> See Book I of *Kautilya's Arthashastra*.

<sup>4</sup> Refer to the secret literature of the Communist International, such as A. Neuberg, *Der bewaffnete Aufstand: Versuch einer theoretischen Darstellung* (Zurich, 1938). (False bibliographical data.)

<sup>5</sup> An effort like that of Charles E. Merriam in *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (New York, 1939) is most exceptional. The leads suggested by Graham Wallas in *The Great Society* (London, 1914) have never been adequately followed up (chaps. x-xiii).

<sup>1</sup> Concerning World War I see Maxmilian Ronge, *Kriegs- und Industrie-Espionage* (Vienna, 1930).

<sup>2</sup> See especially James Westfall Thompson and Saul K. Padover, *Secret Diplomacy: A Record of Espionage and Double-dealing, 1500-1815* (London, 1937).

dignity. Obviously this calls for deeper knowledge of reality than the simple recording of momentary approval of contemplated lines of action.

Although the ideal of human dignity is positive, it entered the stage of the large-scale modern state clad in the scanty garments of negativism. Private businessmen were out to get government out of the market. The expanding business society expressed itself through the competitive market and representative government. The focus of attention of the businessman was limited to the market; the focus of attention of the government man was restricted to auxiliary functions. The postulated pre-established harmony of profit-seeking and national gain was accepted as a moral gloss on the business way of life. "The pursuit of profit is the salvation of the world."<sup>6</sup> No positive conception of the relationship between the parts and the whole of a democratic state was sought. It was not missed.

In recent times the re-expansion of government has redefined the focus of attention of the policy-makers of liberal, democratic states. More and more they are compelled to try to find a unified set of positive objectives, to "reconcile" business and government. At the same moment that the internal structure of the state is changing, the key symbols and symbol elaborations of the state are under attack. Communist revolutionaries deride the democratic aspirations of such states as hypocrisy; Nazi revolutionaries deride them as decadent and contemptible. The Nazis reject both symbols and practices; the Marxists reject only the practices.

The sheer intellectual task of clarifying the goals and instruments of demo-

cratic idealism has gone largely by default. If we look back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, we are impressed by the strength of the intellectual currents that were running toward unity of state aim. When David Hume wrote about social processes, his contributions included not only essays on the balance of trade but on the balance of power. The doctrines of mercantilism<sup>7</sup> were a rather coherent body of policy ideas: states were conceived as succeeding or failing in terms of power (by which was meant political fighting effectiveness); power was believed to depend on stimulating exports in return for precious metals. Goals were so clearly defined that intelligence operations could count goods and weigh bullion and apply this practical meter stick to the measurement of policy success and failure.

The liberal, democratic state did not succeed in harmonizing professed ideal and effective policy, partly because the democratic elements in the ideal were left undeveloped. Intellectual life showed the effect of the bifurcation of market and government, and "political economy" became preoccupied with the routines of the market. In the liberal, democratic state men spoke of "prosperity," not of "power"; yet prosperity was not their ostensible goal. The cardinal value was the dignity of man, but prosperity was not translated in terms of human dignity. Bentham's calculus of felicity was pointed in this direction, but it was not specified in terms capable of being operationally applied to an extremely complicated division of labor.

Some shortcomings of liberal, democratic states have been failures of policy and intelligence; the urgent question of the moment is how these deficiencies can

<sup>6</sup> From my notes of a speech delivered by an American businessman on his return from negotiating the "Dawes Plan."

<sup>7</sup> On the full range of mercantilism consult Eli F. Heckscher, *Der Merkantilismus* (2 vols.; Jena, 1932).

be surmounted. Can the policy-makers who profess ideals of human dignity learn to specify what they mean in operating terms? No doubt the intelligence function can aid, to some extent, in the task of clarification; unquestionably the intelligence facilities of modern society can provide relevant knowledge when goals are put in definite terms.

Modern procedures do make it possible for the first time in the history of large-scale social organization to realize some of the aims of democracy. Social and psychological sciences have developed procedures that are capable of reporting the facts about the thoughts and feelings of our fellow-men. In the Great Society, with its thousands of specialized material environments, its enormous geographical spread, and its instantaneous communication, special measures must be taken to learn the significant facts of life. By means of quick interviews, we can supplement some of the guesses that are made about what men think; and by prolonged interviews and participation we can probe more deeply into the texture of experience. By disciplined methods we can locate the zones of poor democratic performance and determine the factors that contribute to their continuation. We are accustomed to think of production goals for wheat or pig iron and to graph the facts about goal and performance. By using our new instruments of mutual understanding, we can specify our goals and report on their state of realization. The very act of specifying the meaning of human dignity disciplines both our policy-makers and our scientists. The gathering of knowledge can be synchronized with the needs of policy and with the formal standards of science.

We can actually study the thoughts and feelings of each of the major divisions of modern social structure and perfect

means of making them fraternally intelligible to one another. Certainly we professional people need to be reminded constantly, and concisely, of the point of view of skilled and organized labor, of farmers, of unskilled laborers, of small and middle businessmen, of party and government leaders and administrators, of monopolistic and basic businesses. Policy decisions need to be tempered in the light of racial, confessional, and other group attitudes. If democracy includes a decent regard for the thoughts and feelings of others, our procedures can and should be applied to the enormous task of making these facts available to the various components of our society.<sup>8</sup> By examining the contents of the channels of public communication,<sup>9</sup> we may determine the degree to which even the opportunity exists of taking the other fellow into proper account. Up to the present time, it must be conceded, our press, film, and radio channels of mass communication have not adequately performed this task.<sup>10</sup>

Each public policy calls for two types of intelligence: ideological and technical. By ideological intelligence is meant facts about the thoughts, feelings, and conduct of human beings. Other facts are tech-

<sup>8</sup> See Bruce Lannes Smith, "Propaganda Analysis and the Science of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V (1941), 250-59.

<sup>9</sup> Representative recent contributions to this emerging science include: Douglas Waples (ed.), *Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy* (Chicago, 1942); Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page* (New York, 1940); George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (New York, 1940); Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert, *Public Opinion and the Individual* (New York), 1938. On content analysis see Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935), chap. ix; "World Attention Survey," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V (1941), 456-62.

<sup>10</sup> See Harold D. Lasswell, "The Achievement Standards of a Democratic Press," in *Freedom of the Press Today*, ed. Harold L. Ickes (New York, 1941).

nical. It makes no difference whether the policy goal is phrased in ideological or technical terms; both kinds of information are involved in any complete consideration of goals or alternatives. Ideologically phrased objectives are to strengthen the will to victory of the home population; to demoralize the fighting will of the enemy; and to win allies. The attainment of these objectives depends upon many technical considerations, such as geophysical factors affecting radio reception. If goals are phrased in technical terms (tanks, guns, planes), they depend upon data about the thoughts and feelings and conduct of factory workers and of many other elements of the population. It is evident that we are compelled to pass back and forth between ideological and technical facts in contemplating each and every line of policy.

Whatever scheme is used to classify policy, each policy and each category of policy must be properly integrated with every other. By policy we understand the making of important decisions. A decision adds energy and determination to preference; it is part of an act of striving. Values, therefore, are not only indorsed; they are sought by mobilizing a significant part of the values already at hand. The importance of decisions may be appraised according to the magnitude of this potential mobilization of resources. In the most vital personal decisions, character, material goods, friendship, and life are at stake. In the realm of public policy the stakes are comparable: moral integration, material assets, diplomatic position, and continuity.

For any personality, individual or collective, policy is concerned with total value position. Within the field of total policy, distinctions may be drawn that aid decisions by classifying ends and means. In the realm of high policy a fourfold

classification has often been serviceable, according to which the four fronts of policy are military, diplomatic, economic, ideological. Each sphere of policy is to some extent an end and to some extent a means; successful policy proceeds by continuous integration. Thus every proposed military policy must be evaluated with reference to other objectives in the sphere of military policy and to goals in the sphere of diplomacy, economics, and ideology. If the specific military goal is indorsed as consistent and compatible with other objectives, it becomes an end of integrated policy. Other spheres then become integrated to it as means to end. In turn, the military sphere must be integrated with policy initiatives that arise in every other sphere. A diplomatic proposal, designed to aid in the successful negotiation of a trade treaty, may be to offer the inducement of allowing a complement of foreign officers to be trained in American military schools. Perhaps this is consistent and compatible with military objectives; hence the military facilities may be made promptly available as means of carrying out the policy. In the economic sphere it may be proposed to conserve our metal resources by increasing imports. The conservation program may be indorsed on military grounds, and the co-operation of the Navy may be needed to intercept cargoes bound for foreign ports. In the ideological sphere the cultivation of friendship with a foreign power may lead to the suggestion that radio broadcasts be increased to foreign countries from adjacent territory. If the Navy controls bases in adjacent territory, its co-operation is an essential means.

For purposes of brief definition we may sum up the four fronts of policy as ends and means. The end of military policy is predominance over enemies in bat-



tle; the distinctive means are instruments of violence. The end of diplomatic policy is favorable agreement, whatever the substantive character of the agreement; the distinctive means is negotiation. The end of economic policy is production; the distinctive means are productive instruments. The end of ideological policy is favorable attitudes; the most distinctive means are symbols. We may subdivide each policy front into internal and external. If this is done, some clarification is needed about the internal diplomatic front, since usage has limited diplomacy to external relations. In our expanded sense of the word, diplomacy includes offer, counteroffer, consent, dissent, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication, legislation. Hence it is appropriate to speak of the internal diplomacy of a state. At present, there is no consensus on how these internal processes are classified. Sometimes they are assigned to the internal ideological front. Often what are here called diplomacy and ideology are bracketed together as "political" policy—despite the patent advantages of reserving the term "politics" for the over-all term. A threefold division thus results: military, economic, political. Nearly every other thinkable breakdown is sometimes made and is often useful. If a two-term classification is desired, the most satisfactory is the one hinted at above: ideological and technical. In the former the emphasis is upon thoughts and feelings and upon the symbols that circulate through the channels of radio, film, press, and conversation. In the latter the starting-point is material objects. The usual instruments of ideological policy are speeches, news conferences, news releases, magazine articles, photographic stills, newsreels, film shorts, feature films, leaflets, books, cartoons, charts and tables, broadcasts, plays, rumors, maps,

exhibits, demonstrations, letters, telephone messages. Propaganda is the positive guidance of such material; censorship eliminates. Personnel selection for symbolic rather than technical reasons also comes within the field of ideological action. In this theater of operations personnel choices need to be made in the interest of democratic integration. Army and civilian cadres are made up of varying ratios of persons answering different specifications as to age, sex, size, income, education, residence, religion, party (and the like). Some combinations aid democratic attitudes; others militate against them.

What the intelligence function can contribute to policy may be exemplified in certain simple instances on different policy fronts. The contributions can be summed up in three points: intelligence can (1) clarify goals, (2) clarify alternatives, and (3) provide needed knowledge. First, a military example: Reconnaissance reveals that hill 46 can be enveloped by routes 1 or 2. If orders are not clear, instructions may be requested. It may be pointed out that liaison would be easier to maintain along 1 than 2, but that 5 per cent more casualties could be anticipated. This statement of alternatives could be supported, if challenged, by facts about the deployment of enemy forces in the immediate sector and by facts about losses under comparable conditions. Second, an example from diplomacy: Policy instructions may be to negotiate a trade agreement, but the time period may be left vague. Intelligence may report that peaceful persuasion would produce the result in about six months; that an opportunity to receive stock in American business concerns would diminish opposition so much that success could be hoped for in three months. The supporting facts include

knowledge of the attitudes of influential leaders. A third example is economic: If available steel is used to reach the tank quota, the shipbuilding quota will suffer by one-fourth. Intelligence may therefore ask for clarification of goal and support the estimates by data about present stocks and production ratios. A fourth example is ideological: Are atrocity stories to be played up more in the future than in the recent past? Intelligence may report that if more atrocity stories are circulated among the wives of skilled workers, it may give them a more vivid sense of what war is and stimulate their aggressive interest in helping their husbands keep on the job. This estimate of the probable result may be supported by interview data collected in the field and by the results of an experiment in which more interest in the war is indicated after reports of Japanese atrocities.

These instances have deliberately been selected on a low level of abstraction, but they show the essential interrelations between policy and intelligence. In practice, decision-makers of every level are finding new goals and subgoals, contemplating new alternatives, asking for new information as a means of evaluating future probabilities. Policy thinking is "forward" thinking; it is manipulative and responsible. It is always guided to some extent by knowledge; and a recurring problem is to perfect the intelligence function so that it brings to the focus of attention of the decision-maker what he most needs to think about and what he most needs to think with.

We may classify the types of knowledge needed for ideological policy as follows: (1) distribution of attitudes, (2) trend of attitudes, and (3) comparisons of available alternatives with past situations and with scientific findings. In the example above the distribution of atti-

tudes in the homes of war workers is obviously pertinent to war production; knowledge of whether the trend had been more or less favorable would highlight the seriousness of the problem; comparison of the results of exposure to atrocity news would be relevant to decision.

Attitudes are hypothetical patterns of reality; the terms used to name attitudes must be given operational definitions from the standpoint of many different observers. In giving instructions for the identification of carbon, we have no trouble in choosing a definitive index. But this is not true of an attitude, like hatred of the President or of Hitler. We must work with many indices and construct rather arbitrary rules to govern the inclusion or exclusion of the resulting profiles.

Attitudes may be inferred from many kinds of data: (1) what people say and do; (2) what is said to people; (3) what is done to people. We may record what people say and do when they are unaware that they are being interviewed or when they are unaware that they are being observed for scientific or policy purposes. Our observer may be so situated that he may affect the result by influencing the attitude of the subject, or he may not. An example of the former case is the interviewer or participant-observer; although the subjects do not know the full significance of the participant-observer, they respond to a definite person in the situation. A spectator-observer may be buried in the grandstands and have no effect on the conduct he is watching. In the same way the reader of an intercepted message may have no personal effect.

By examining what is said to people, we may be able to foresee their responses. Policy-makers are accustomed to rely upon inferences that they make from

what is brought to the focus of public attention in the mediums of mass communication. Many decisions are affected by inferences about public response that are made when the policy-maker reads a newspaper or listens to a broadcast on the way to the office. Inferences may also be based upon knowledge of what has been done to people and of how they have responded in the past. Thus, if we hear of acute housing congestion, of speed-up, of rising prices of consumption goods, of shortages of consumption goods, of rapid introduction of groups against which there is a local bias (racial, religious, partisan), we may construct many plausible inferences that are often confirmed by additional data.

The terms used to describe people are of cardinal importance, since they imply hypotheses about the factors that significantly affect response. We are concerned both with position in the social structure and with personality structure.

The organization of the intelligence function calls for the proper articulation of many specialists with policy-makers. Some problems arise because of the novelty of the procedures involved. Since the science of communication is itself in its infancy, the opportunities now open stimulate both imagination and ambition. Specialists who have become associated with the development of one specific procedure of observation are often prone to exaggerate its place in the total picture. Hence they may "oversell" one group of policy-makers on the results that can be expected from polling or psychiatric interviewing or content analysis or organizational analysis. Acceptance of a given skill group may be followed by disillusioned rejection, and the growth of a mature and well-developed intelligence operation may be retarded.

Policy-makers in business and govern-

ment are well acquainted with the idea of describing the distribution of attitudes in a given group. They are also familiar with the idea of describing the distribution of politically significant symbols at the focus of attention of a group. The former has come from the counting of votes in elections and in poll interviews. The second has come from the practice of clipping the press of selected groups. Clipping bureaus are long-established institutions inside and outside government. The opinion poll has made rapid progress since the appearance of the American Institute of Public Opinion.

Although the idea of quantitative summaries of significant material is widely accepted, their interpretation is capricious. If you believe in the importance of world-organization after the war, you will probably be less critical of data that purport to show that a great many Americans look forward to such an outcome. If, on the contrary, you reject this goal, you may dismiss entirely the procedure by which the data were obtained or you may engage in vigorous methodological controversies about it. It is not generally recognized that, while the words recorded in brief polling interviews are highly valid in predicting elections, they are of indeterminate validity in forecasting how people will respond in situations that are as yet unorganized. The focus of attention of the group is in an advanced state of organization with respect to action when mid-election polls are taken; but remarks about price regulation may have no more significance than showing that the term itself is a negative word to most of the responders. Hence if something is to be done, it may be useful to reselect the validating symbols.

Another difficulty arises from the task of selecting and presenting certain kinds of information in a form deemed useful



by policy-makers. Policy-makers are usually poised toward action. They want to choose between clear-cut courses of action. Hence intelligence material must be processed in a way that commends it to decision-makers.<sup>11</sup> Now scientists are accustomed to think in intervariable ("equilibrium") terms and to appraise their data as pertinent or not if they confirm or disconfirm a general proposition that is part of the systematic structure of their science. Hence they are not accustomed to consider the timing of their results in terms of policy objectives. If they find that experimental animals show more scratching and biting behavior when they are put on short rations than when they are cut down in sexual opportunities, they may take it for granted that these results are pertinent to policy. But what policy? Do they expect policy-makers to cut down on sex opportunities rather than rations? If so, when and where? Notice that there may indeed be policy implications; my only point is that the act of processing intelligence material must find an acceptable relationship to the policy-maker's conception of his policy alternatives.

Scientists who are accustomed to long interviews are faced with the problem of cutting their results down to a form that is valuable for policy and yet preserves something of the depth perspective of their data. From brief polling results we may know that 60 per cent say "Yes," 20 per cent say "No," and 20 per cent are noncommittal in reply to a question. If we look at the replies in the perspective of intensive knowledge, we may rearrange them in many different ways. Ten per cent of those who say "yes" may do so

because they want to bring about a negotiated peace; 20 per cent may say "Yes" because they want to block a "peace without victory." But the 10 per cent may own and affect by advertising newspapers that reach millions of people. It is a sterilizing process to limit the description of how people feel and think to an over terse bar chart; yet the busy executive may be impatient of the time it takes to read a set of qualifying riders.

Intensive procedures can be most effectively used when they are guided toward the "sore spots" or the "success spots" revealed by quick, extensive procedures like polling or brief content analysis. Also, intensive procedures can be pointed toward policy problems that can be dealt with at rather long intervals. The effect of withdrawing husbands and fathers from the home needs to be studied, and these investigations are best done by intensive methods. The policy alternatives may grow out of exploratory investigations; they may, for example, result in vigorous measures to increase the time spent out of the home and in selected community activities.

We are able to adapt to the needs of ideological intelligence many of the presentation forms developed for limited use in our society. In some ways the best and the most characteristic intelligence report is the prospectus offered to potential investors in new undertakings. The prospectus may rest on a foundation of vast research conducted by production engineers, market analysts, and many other technicians. No matter how elaborate the factual groundwork, the final results are put in clear-cut and inviting synoptic form. Photographs and charts illustrate the text, and the text is arranged freely to aid clarity, brevity, and emphasis. Good prospectus writers have successful careers because of the exceptional

<sup>11</sup> A classical discussion of "Thought at the Level of Planning" is in Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1940), Part IV.

utility of the function they perform as go-between, uniting promoter, technician, and investor.

Documentary reports cannot take the place of personal presentation if full advantage is to be taken of research and planning. Ideological material is less definitive than technical reports, and, if it is to be correctly related to policy, the head of intelligence must be a member of the inner policy councils. Only by constant emphasis can policy-makers come to recognize the full degree of their reliance upon certain facts for basic clarification of their task.

The intelligence operation constantly asks for new specifications of objectives. Policy-makers often leave goals phrased in ambiguous language, hence open to misunderstanding. One function of the intelligence branch is to point out any handicapping ambiguousness and to bring about authoritative declarations. Often the goals enunciated by makers of policy are inconsistent or even contradictory; hence the policy branch must often call for new directives at every level of decision. Often, too, authoritative statements are entirely missing in reference to many zones of action; one duty of an intelligence branch is to call attention to these omissions.

When the process of goal discovery has been carried to the most inclusive objective, we come to the key ideals of the state. The specialists on integrating the flow of fact cannot bring about goal clarification unless the need of integrated policy is widely felt. Intelligence specialists who try to force rigorous proclamation of purpose may fail to carry the policy group along with them. During our present period of transition from a business-dominant to a government-dominant state, the relationships between those who formulate authoritative declarations

of policy and those who perform the intelligence function will be in a constant state of redefinition. To push ahead too far and too fast will often lead to the rejection of disciplined fact-gathering. And yet failure to keep the need of clarity at the focus of attention of policy-makers is to delay needed adjustments to reality.

At present the nontotalitarian states have difficulty in formulating war and peace aims. As a result of World War I legalistic and diplomatic aims were revealed as obviously insufficient to the needs of policy. Of course, we stand for legal order; but what is the form of social structure that will sustain the sense of justice capable of sustaining a legal order of the type we want? The influential elements of nontotalitarian states reveal their policy confusion when they are reluctant to put their objectives in basic terms of social structure. We still hear of "victory" as a goal; but "victory for what?" is not made manifest.

The crux of the matter is that deep timidity complicates the task of translating democratic aspirations into compelling institutional terms. Slogans like the "Four Freedoms" are not enough unless they are completed by slogans that point to the operating rules of a society that puts freedom into practice. We are in a war of ideas, but we have not found our ideas. It is essential to face our timidity without fear and to deal with them directly. Some of the reluctance of our leaders of wealth and government springs from basic pessimism about the possibility of maintaining the fundamental characteristics of our pattern of state and society. In one sense, Marxist predestinarianism has conquered the world, for there is deep distrust of the prospects of any order save one distinguished by total governmentalization of organized activity. Our intellectuals have not even clari-

fied in operational terms the meaning of a social order compatible with human dignity and safeguarded by a balanced structure. A striking example of this hiatus concerns the middle classes. For centuries it has been an axiom of much political philosophy that freedom depended upon perpetuating a flourishing middle group between the extremely rich and the extremely poor. This means that the condition most favorable to a free society is a balanced income structure. Despite the fundamental need of clarity in this vital matter, our thinkers and decision-makers have not succeeded in specifying rules of balance. Despite our quantifying tendencies in production and in the intellectual life, we have not chosen

critical ratios of balance and defined in clear terms the fundamental conditions and goals of policy. At present we do not clearly and vividly stand for the principle of dynamic balance versus despotism and anarchism. In these years of stress, however, we may succeed in discovering a unifying conception of democratic policy. When this unity is found, the ideological intelligence function will be smoothly articulated with policy. In the meanwhile there can be a persistent and clarifying interplay between such branches of the intelligence function as can be perfected and those who share in the making of important decisions.

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